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Re-engineering the Dutch Flower Auctions: A Framework for Analyzing 
Exchange Organizations 
Abstract 
T h s  paper specifies a generalizable model of exchange processes and develops 
a process-stakeholder analysis framework to evaluate alternative market 
designs. This framework is applied to analyze a number of information 
technology initiatives in the Dutch flower markets. The Dutch flower 
auctions are the world's leading centers for trading cut-flowers and potted 
plants. We undertake a cross-case analysis and apply our framework to 
analyse successes and failures in the introduction of new IT-based trading 
mechanisms in these markets. Based on our study, we develop a number of 
testable propositions on: the separation of physical and informational 
processes in trading, the responses of stakeholders to changes in available 
information due to IT initiatives, and economic and incentive conditions 
required for adoption of new trading processes. Finally, our detailed cases 
illustrate the institutional and incentive constraints, and complexities 
encountered in the introduction of new electronic markets. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Information technology enables new ways of coordinating the exchange of 
goods and services. Improved communications and processing systems like 
the Internet and video conferencing allow individuals and organizations to 
radically re-engineer existing trading processes enabling new forms of 
electronic commerce and markets. 
Markets are real or virtual meeting places where buyers, sellers, and 
intermediaries, meet to exchange or transfer property rights from one party to 
another. Typically, buyers and sellers confront many different uncertainties 
and risks in trading. These include the inability to forecast or plan for the 
future given the traders' bounded rationality and market uncertainty, 
combined with the potential for opportunism given the divergent interests of 
different market participants (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Markets and other 
governance mechanisms, provide specific information processing capabilities 
to exchange parties and serve to generate information and trust to reduce the 
uncertainty and risks inherent in the exchange process (Kambil, 1992). To 
reduce uncertainty and risk, markets as institutions provide specific routines 
and procedures for coordination, and the information and guarantees that 
enable the buyers and sellers to undertake the exchange. 
Prior research on the effects of information technology (IT) on exchange 
organizations and processes typically applied transaction costs and agency 
theory to predict shifts from hierarchies toward market or other intermediate 
forms of organizations (Bakos, 1991a, Johnston and Lawrence, 1988, Malone, 
et al., 1987, Powell, 1990). A central argument of these articles was that 
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information technology would improve communications, searches, 
monitoring and information-sorting capabilities, to reduce transaction costs 
and allow purchasers to take advantage of production economies available i n  
markets. A critical drawback of this analysis was the definition of markets i n  
abstract economic terms (i.e., markets coordinate economic activity through a 
price mechanism) without consideration for differences in market 
organization. For example, some different market types include direct search 
marke t s  where partners directly seek each other out (e-g a typical retail fruit 
and vegetable market), brokered marke ts  where exchange parties employ 
agents to seek compatible partners (e.g private placement offerings by 
investment banks), dealer markets where dealers as intermediaries hold, buy 
and sell product inventories (e.g NASDAQ), and auction marke ts  where 
traders transact directly through a centralized intermediary (e.g Sotheby's art 
auctions). Each of these mechanisms organizes the trading process and related 
information processing activities in different ways. Thus, we can expect the 
impact and role of IT can vary across types. 
More recently, information systems researchers have examined the impact of 
information technology on market institutions. Konsynski et al., (1992, 1989, 
1990, 1989) provided a number of descriptive case studies of electronic 
markets providing a rich case base for research. Clemons and Weber (1990, 
1991) examined the effects of computerization on the London Stock Exchange 
and Lee (1993) provided a technology to support order matching of complex 
products. These studies begin to consider the importance of different market 
types and institutional histories. 
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Despite the increasing number of cases on electronic markets, a common 
language and categorization of key processes in a trading system is lacking. 
Such a categorization is a precondition to building a framework to 
systematically evaluate and compare the structure and benefits of different 
markets for various stakeholders. Building on transaction costs and 
information-processing models (Galbraith, 1974, Tushman and Nadler, 1978), 
this paper provides both a model of key exchange processes and a process- 
stakeholder analysis framework for comparing across different market 
structures. Such a framework is important to managers who must select and 
design new trading models. It is also important to researchers who want to 
develop models of how information technology affects exchange 
organizations and create theories that can be generalized across cases. We 
illustrate and apply this framework to evaluate different electronic commerce 
initiatives in the Dutch flower markets. The framework for analysis 
developed in this paper can apply to the analysis of other market structures. 
2.0 Exchange: A Process Stakeholder Analysis 
Exchange is a critical subject of study in marketing, economics, finance and 
information systems. Building on these disciplines information systems 
researchers have typically adopted a number of outcome dimensions to 
characterize and evaluate markets. For example, Clemons and Weber (1990) 
characterize financial markets in terms of liquidity, volatility and 
transparency. Liquidity is the ability of the market to absorb large orders 
without significant price changes, indicating the depth and extent of market 
participation by buyers and sellers. Volatility refers to the variance in day-to- 
day volumes and prices, and transparency refers to keeping the widest group 
of buyers informed on current prices and allowing them access to trading. 
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Highly-liquid markets with low volatilihr and h g h  transparency provide 
stable forums for exchange. 
While these outcome characterizations of different market institutions are 
important, they are not easily generalizable across settings. For example, 
liquidity is a key indicator of market quality for financial markets but it is an  
inappropriate measure in the case of Dutch flower auctions. First, the size of 
any one flower order is limited, so it is hard to evaluate the impact on price of 
large orders. Second, the flowers are sold from the auction to the buyer 
without further resale among the buyers. Common outcome 
characterizations such as liquidity don't apply to all market exchange 
relations. Outcome characterizations also do not help managers to evaluate 
the potential impact of a new information technology innovation on the 
operations of a trading system, or the costs and benefits to different 
stakeholders. 
A model of key exchange processes is necessary to provide a reference point 
for comparing the organization of different market institutions. Traditional 
process classifications of exchange include: search, bargaining and 
negotiation, monitoring and enforcement processes (Coase, 1937, Dahlman, 
1979)l. However, this level of classification does not provide sufficient detail 
for the comparison of alternative market structures. What is required is a 
1 Coase (1937) states, for "a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is one wishes to 
deal with, inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, conduct negotiations 
leading up to a bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure 
that terms of the contract are being observed and so on". This specifies a minimum of three 
sequential activities: search to gather information and determine products and parties to 
transactions, bargaining and negotiations to determine the terms of exchange, and the 
construction and adoption of monitoring, policing and enforcement mechanisms to ensure parties 
will satisfactorily perform the exchange. 
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classification of exchange processes that is generalizable, focuses attention on  
salient dimensions of an exchange relation and provides sufficiently-detailed 
information for effective classification of exchange features into independent 
process categories. We adapt work by Kambil (1992) to build such a 
classification scheme grounded in transactions cost and information- 
processing theories. 
2.1 A Model of Exchange Processes 
Kambil (1992) identifies ten distinct informational processes that can operate 
in an exchange relation, providing a basis for a finer-grained analysis of 
market structure and costs. This categorization also recognizes that basic trade 
processes exist within a wider context of support processes that implement 
dispute resolution, and other mechanisms to ensure counterparties to trades 
will meet their obligations. We adopt, refine and extend his model below into 
five trade processes (search, valuation, logistics, payments and settlements, 
authentication) and five trade context processes (communications, product 
representation, legitimation, influence, and dispute resolution). The basic 
trade processes are distinct processes required in all transactions of goods and 
services. The trade context processes facilitate and enable or reduce the costs of 
or "frictions" in the basic processes. Figure 1 illustrates these processes which 
are defined and discussed in Tables 1 & 2 below. 
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Trade Context 
Processes 
Basic Trade 
Processes 
Figure 1: Exchange Processes 
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Table 1: Description of Basic Trade Processes 
Process 
I. Search 
2. Valuation 
(Price 
negotiation) 
3. Logistics 
4. Payment 
and 
sett lements 
5. Authenti- 
cation 
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Description of Basic Trade Processes 
The information gathering and evaluation process undertaken by 
buyers and sellers to identify trading opportunities. A trading 
opportunity consists of a supplier willing to offer a good and a 
buyer interested in purchasing the good. Thus search processes 
identify potential suppliers, goods, and customers willing to 
purchase the good. Different market mechanisms implement 
varied methods and venues to identify trading opportunities. 
Different search methods allocate different search costs to buyers, 
sellers or intermediaries. 
The process and methods of negotiating, and discovering a 
purchase or sale prices for a product. A variety of different price 
discovery and bidding processes exist that differentially attributes 
costs to buyers; sellers and intermediaries. For example, various 
auction methods are specified in Davis and Holt (Davis and Holt, 
1993) for finding prices. Price discovery mechanisms can also be 
biased to shift surplus from the trade to specific transaction 
stakeholders. 
The processes specifying and coordinating the actual delivery of 
goods from the seller to buyer. Again in a trade, the direct costs of 
delivery may be assumed differentially by different players. 
These processes define the terms and methods of payment 
permitted, and ensure the settlement of payments in the 
exchange. Third parties often provide the infrastructures for 
exchange. 
This is a core set of activities used to verify the quality and features 
of the product offered, the authenticity of the trading parties, and 
monitor conformance to the contract or agreement among parties. 
Authentication may involve third parties who provide credit 
check, notarization and other services to reduce the uncertainty of 
buyers and sellers. Authenticating the quality of a product prior to 
purchase mitigates against adverse selection risks (Akerlof, 1970, 
Klein, et al., 1978). Monitoring processes in a complex transaction 
work to ensure that the trade is successfully completed and 
mitigate against moral hazard risks. Third parties to the 
transaction may play a critical role in monitoring transactions, 
ensuring non-repudiation and completion of agreements. 
Table 2: Description of Trade Context Processes 
Process 
6. 
'Ornrnuni- 
cations 
7. 
Product 
Representat 
ion 
(specificatio 
n )  
8. Legitim- 
ation 
9. Influence 
Structures 
and 
Processes 
-10. Dispute 
Resolut'on 
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Description of Trade Context Processes 
Communications processes underly and support all trading activities. Buyers, 
sellers and intermediaries can choose to coordinate in each of the trade processes 
by using different media and methods. Different media choices applied to trade 
processes can have different capacities to represent products (lean vs. rich media 
- (Daft and Lengel, 1986)), as well as speed of information transfer, ease-of-use 
characteristics and infrastructure costs. As we will illustrate later in this paper, 
differences in communications methods can impose specific transaction costs or 
opportunity costs on buyers and sellers. 
Product representation process determine how the product attributes are specified 
to the buyer or other third parties. To what extent is there a standardized 
product and quality specification language? Both the buyers' and sellers' costs are 
reduced by informafional standards or well-specified languages to represent the  
key quality, functional and aesthetic attributes of the product. If the product is 
well represented, the uncertainty of the buyer is lower. The costs and methods of 
implementing a uniform product representation scheme vary in different market 
mechanisms.. 
This process is used to validate the trade or exchange agreement. It defines how 
bids, or agreements are recognized as valid and binding commitments by exchange 
parties. In different trading situations, different procedures and rituals are 
undertaken to legitimate a transaction. Often this is done by announcing the  
agreement, and participants to the agreement, to a broader audience through a 
formal process. 
These processes implement mechanisms to enforce obligations or penalties to 
reduce opportunism risks. Kambil (1992) defines two distinct influence processes 
developed from social exchange and transactions cost theories. These are: 
incentives and sanctions, and credible commitments. Incentives and sanctions 
include performance rewards for completing a contract on time, or penalties for 
misrepresenting products, or denial of access to an exchange network. A 
reputational system def ies  a special class of incentives and sanctions. Actions 
taken to enhance and create a good reputations serve to create trust in the party. 
When a social system establishes reputations as a valued asset to sellers or 
buyers, opportunistic behaviour that can sully the reputation becomes more 
costly. 
investment in credible commitments (Williamson, 1985) or asset-specialized 
investments by both exchange parties creates hostages such that the loss of t he  
relationship will create a significant cost for both parties. This serves to signal 
committrnent to the relationship by both parties and mitigates against 
opportunism risks. The types of commitments, the importance of reputation, and 
institutional authority to create incentives and sanctions can serve to reduce risks 
and the costs associated with other processes. 
All exchanges occur in a broader legal or institutional context which provide 
various processes for resolving disputes among parties and structures decision 
rights in the event of conflict. Firms may elect to directly resolve disputes 
through negotiation, commit to third-party arbitration or court ordering of 
disputes. The latter is typically the most expensive alternative. Dispute- 
resolution processes adopted in an exchange relation, and the allocation of 
decision rights to structure solutions to disputes are crucial to reducing risks for 
buyers and sellers. Where goods are exchanged, disputes can be resolved by 
replacement of a defective product, and warranty mechanisms. 
The ten process categories described described in Table 1 & 2 provide parties to 
an exchange relation with the information processing, coordination and 
influence mechanisms required to mitigate uncertainty and exchange-related 
risks. While we cannot prove that our categorizations define all processes 
related to exchange, we propose that these categories define the key processes 
underlying trades. The categories allow systematic identification of processes 
affected by a specific administrative or technological innovation, and enable 
us to systematically examine and represent the impacts of information 
techno log^ across interdependent processes and stakeholders in an electronic 
market. 
The implementation and operation of the above processes and systems create 
transaction costs for different stakeholders to the exchange. Transaction costs 
and the complexity of these processes increase as products and production 
become more complex, and as the market environment becomes more 
uncertain. Transaction costs also increase as exchange parties establish more 
complex mechanisms to defuse opportunism risks. Traditional economics 
postulates that firms will choose to organize exchange relations so that they 
achieve the lowest possible combined transaction and production costs. This 
would suggest the trading mechanisms with the Iowest sum of transaction 
costs across all the processes will evolve and dominate the market. However, 
real-market institutions are complex, constituting a meeting point for 
stakeholders with both convergent and divergent interests. Innovations by a 
specific stakeholder may reduce overall transactions costs but can increase the 
costs to other parties. This can result in the failure to adopt a specific 
technology or administrative innovation in the marketplace. Thus we 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-96-24 
propose the need for a process-stakeholder analysis to systematically evaluate 
the effects of technological innovations on specific processes as well as costs 
and benefits that arise from the innovation on different stakeholders. 
Below we develop and illustrate the utility of a process-stakeholder analysis 
in focusing attention on critical features of trading mechanisms, by using it to 
systematically represent and evaluate the effects of various information 
technology initiatives in the Dutch flower auctions (DFA). 
3.0 The Dutch Flower Auctions 
The Netherlands is the world's leading producer and distributor of cut 
flowers. This industry consists of about eleven thousand growers and nearly 
five thousand buyers. Growers are typically family businesses, while buyers 
represent both large and small wholesalers and retailers. The Dutch dominate 
the world export market for cut flowers with 59 percent of the world market 
share in 1995. The Dutch flower auctions established and owned by grower 
cooperatives play a vital role in Holland's leadership of this industry by 
providing efficient centers for price discovery, and the exchange of flowers 
between buyers and sellers. The world's two largest flower auctions are the 
Flower Auction Aalsmeer (VBA) and the Flower Auction Holland (BVH) i n  
Holland. These auctions trade over 30 million flowers and conduct nearly 
100,000 transactions daily generating over $1.8 billion in annual sales of cut 
flower and potted products from the Netherlands, and other producers such 
as Israel, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Annual sales of the seven Dutch flower 
auctions exceed $2.2 billion. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-96-24 
The flower auctions use the "Dutch" auction method for price determination. 
This method uses a clock, with the clock hand starting at a high price 
determined by the auctioneer and dropping till a buyer stops the clock by 
pushing a button to bid for a lot at the price determined by the clock hand. 
This method was invented by a Dutch cauliflower grower in the 1870s to trade 
agricultural products. It reduces the time spent by growers at markets and 
frees them from the task of bidding and price determination, thereby allowing 
them to focus on production. It also reduces the time buyers spend in bidding 
or bargaining for goods. 
The flower auctions provide a central location for the meeting of buyers, with 
suppliers allowing for efficiencies in quality control, logistics and product 
redistribution. Flower Auction Aalsmeer (VBA) near Schipol airport, and the 
Bloemenveiling Holland (BVH) near Rotterdam are located close to major 
transportation facilities and have some of the largest commercial buildings i n  
the world. Both auctions spread across the equivalent of about 100 soccer 
fields, each with the capacity to host 2,000 buyers. At the VBA the flower 
auctions occur in different auction rooms under thirteen different clocks. 
The computerized clock in the auction hall provides buyers with information 
on the producer, product, unit of currency, quality, and minimum purchase 
quantity. The flowers are transported through the auction hall and shown 
below the clock to buyers. When the buyer stops the clock, the auctioneer uses 
the intercom to ask the buyer how many units of a lot he or she will 
purchase. The buyer provides the bid, and when accepted the clock is reset 
and the process is re-started to clear the remaining inventory. The auctioneer 
may introduce a new minimum quantity to ensure the entire lot clears. Each 
clock can handle nearly 1,000 transactions an hour (approximately one 
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I 
transaction in four seconds). On average, fifteen million flowers are traded 
daily at the VBA in 30,000 transactions. 
We investigated the use of information technology in these auctions over the 
span of three years, collecting data through interviews with auction officials 
and participants, and the review of all relevant published reports and 
archival material. Next we used the process categories identified in the 
previous section to organize the information and systematically evaluate or 
compare the impacts of specific IT innovations and process changes on 
different stakeholders in the DFA. This process-stakeholder analysis was used 
to identify changes in benefits and costs of different exchange processes, and 
the relative value of these innovations to different stakeholders. A case 
method was used because it enables rich data and "reality" to be captured in 
greater detail than other methods. The case method also permits us to 
consider a greater number of explanatory variables. We then undertook a 
cross-case analysis on multiple IT initiatives in the Dutch flower markets to 
generate propositions that explain the success or failure of specific 
innovations and more general impacts of new information technologies on 
markets. While we acknowledge that a single case cannot be generalized into 
a theory, a cross-case analysis is a useful step in theorv construction by 
identifying patterns that provide testable propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 
1981). 
3.1 An Evaluation of the Traditional Dutch Flower Auction 
Utilizing the previous process categories, Table 3 summarizes the key 
features, strengths and weaknesses of the traditional Dutch flower auction. 
This provides a baseline for comparision and evaluation of process changes 
enabled by information technology. 
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Table 3: Features, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Dutch Auctions. 
txchange Process 
1. Search 
2. Valuation 
3. Logistics 
' 4. Payments and 
Settlements 
5 .  Authentication 
- 6. Communication 
7. Product 
Represents tion 
' 8. Legitimation 
- 9. influence 
10. Dispute 
Resolution 
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Implementation 
All trading opportunities 
are found at the auctions. 
The Dutch auction clock 
method 
The auction facilities are a 
central hub providing 
logistics support for 
transfenin products from 
buyer to seflers. These 
costs are shared among all 
buvers. 
The auctions provide 
systems for order tracking, 
payments and settlements 
with efficient oneday 
settlement periods. 
The auction house 
authenticates participants 
and grades the quality of 
the products. It is also 
res onsible for tracking 
an$ensuring delivery of 
orders to buyers. 
Simple visual 
communications of 
competitors, product, price 
and other trading 
information on the clock. A 
simple computerized 
system for communicating 
bids. 
The product is represented 
by itself, and simple codes 
identifyin grower, and a 
gross levekqualini grade. 
The auction intermediary 
is res onsible for 
r e c o r k g  bids, and 
legitimatin~ transactions. 
The auctions can exclude 
growers or buyers who do 
not meet various criteria. 
The auctions provide for 
various arbitration 
mechanisms, and rules for 
resolving problems. This 
reduces dispute resolution 
costs. 
Strengths 
Search costs are reduced 
as the centralized auction 
aggregates major trading 
opportunities in one 
location. 
Verv efficient for small lot 
trading. All transactions 
occur in a fixed time slot 
leading to 1000 
transactions per hour 
Very efficient transier of 
roduct from seller to 
guyers. The centralized 
auction trading allows 
specialization 
transportation and other 
resources. 
Shared costs among 
auction participants, and 
economies of scale in these 
systems. 
Very efficient for large 
numbers trading. The 
auction reduces counter- 
party risks, product, and 
related authentication 
costs for buyers and 
sellers. 
Efficient and low costs for 
shared comunications 
infrastructure 
Buyers can directly inspect 
the product in the auction 
hall if they want to d o  so. 
The auctions, by 
centralizing and re uirin 
the product to be d e l v e r 2  
prior to sale, minimizes 
opportunism risks. 
Weaknesses 
The buyers have to come to 
the auction halls, and 
sellers have to deliver 
roduce to the auction 
Eall. 
Auction prices for specific 
products decrease during 
the day. To assure 
fairness, assignment of 
auction sequence for 
different growers is done 
by Iotter.  
Clock speeds 
and sma 1 lots (Staff- 
Reporter, 1994f) stretch 
the cognitive capabilities 
of buyers favoring higher 
prices for growers 
Packaging costs are 
incurred multiple times - 
for transport to and from 
the auction. Multiple 
handlin of flowers can 
damage e m  8 
Buyers and growers 
perceive y l i ~  grades a s  
too broa , artlficlally 
inflating valuation of 
products at the lower end 
of quality rating. 
Requires synchronous 
communications for 
trading, and colocation of 
parties to the limited 
trading floor. Growers d o  
not know final demand 
patterns for products 
Buyers and growers 
perceive quality grades as 
too broad. The cost of 
visual inspection. 
Auction rules tend to favor 
the growers. 
The Dutch flower auctions provide buyers and sellers with a highly efficient 
infrastructure to support exchange. As summarized in Table 3., they provide 
efficient search, communication, and product representation capabilities for 
highly varied products. The auctions are also very efficient in determining 
price, enabling approximately a thousand transactions per clock per hour on a 
low-value good. The auction method eliminates problems of haggling and 
reduces bargaining costs that are otherwise associated with the trade of 
nonstandard and unusual-value products (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990): By 
operating at a high clock speed, encouraging competition among buyers, and 
setting a fixed time by which to complete a transaction (or the clock goes to 
zero) the auction enables efficient trading. The hub and spoke operation, and 
the logistics within the auction hall allows the timely transfer of a large 
volume of flowers from suppliers to buyers. By inter-mediating all buyer- 
grower exchanges, the auction also provides efficient quality control, 
settlement and dispute resolution mechanisms that mitigate against 
opportunism risks encountered by buyers and sellers. These features reduce 
transaction costs to growers and buyers. 
However, as summarized in Table 3, there are disadvantages of this specific 
model 'of trading. First, buyers must be physically present at the correct 
location and correct time to bid on a specific product. In addition, it is hard to 
simultaneously search other markets to estimate prices. Today, large buying 
organizations provide cellular phones to their buyers to coordinate purchases 
across auctions. In response, the auctions are beginning to coordinate trading 
similar products at the same times in different auction houses. This will 
allow the large buyers to find the best price across auctions. The auction 
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structure also inhibits growers from understanding the true preferences of 
buyers, as growers are separated from the sale of their produce by the auction. 
Other disadvantages for specific stakeholders are understood when we 
consider the auction's ownership and incentive structure. A number of 
auction rules favor grou7ers who are the auction owners, over buyers. First, 
the clocks move at a high speed. Higher speeds reduce the decision time 
available to buyers. Ths  results in higher bid prices. The auctions have 
experimented with different clock speeds and it is widely known that faster 
clock speeds result in higher prices. However, the auctions are unwilling to 
fully disclose the results of their experiments and selection of auction clock 
speeds. Second, the auction rules and service costs to buyers for processing 
trades favors trading in smaller lots instead of purchases of large lots. This 
ensures that no one party can purchase the entire lot without competition. It 
also increases the cognitive complexity and competition confronted by buyers. 
Buyers must now purchase products and adjust purchasing decisions to 
availability across multiple clock auctions. This imperfect information, and 
low transparency about available inventories favors growers, although more 
empirical work needs to be done to discover the magnitude of the growers' 
advantage- 
3.2 Challenges to the Traditional Dutch Auctions 
In the early 1990s the Dutch flower industry and auctions faced a number of 
challenges. First, rapid growth in the flower industry created increasing 
demands for logistics support, space in the auctions and complaints about 
nearby traffic congestion. As the two major auctions were close to their limits 
in terms of complexity, capacity and room to expand, increases in capacity 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
Working Paper IS-96-24 
would require changes in auction logistics or investment in new facilities. A 
second problem confronted by the industry was the consolidation of buyers 
into larger entities. Buyers for supermarkets and large retail store chains 
wanted to purchase larger lot sizes and coordinate purchases across different 
markets to take advantage of the best price. Some large retailers like Marks 
and Spencer were bypassing the Dutch auctions and their commissions to 
source directly from growers in Spain and other countries. Third, the success 
of the Dutch auctions as the world's leading flower auctions and entry point 
into downtream logistics and distribution, led to an increased flow of foreign 
cut-flowers to the Dutch flower auctions. In 1994,15°/~ of flowers traded at the 
largest Dutch Flower auctions were imported from and re-exported to foreign 
countries (sometimes back to the country of origin). This increased foreign 
competition to Dutch growers, and in 1993, the import of foreign rose stems 
to the two largest auctions reduced average prices by 40% during the winter 
season. Subsequently, the Dutch grower cooperatives voted to limit foreign 
access to the major auctions in 1994. These challenges led to a number of 
successful and unsuccessful information technology-enabled transformations 
of trading in the industry. These initiatives are critically examined below 
using a process-stakeholder analysis to illustrate major process changes and 
benefits or costs of the initiatives to different stakeholders. 
4.0 IT-Enabled Dutch Auction Transformations: A Process-Stakeholder 
Analysis 
Four major information technology-enabled initiatives were undertaken to 
transform the Dutch flower auctions and respond to the above challenges. 
Two unsuccessful initiatives were the BVH's Holland Vidifleur system and 
the VBA's Sample-Based Auction (SBA) system. These initiatives promised 
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to simplify auction hall logistics and add extra transaction capacity to the 
auction. Two successful initiatives were the Holland Supply Bank (HSB) 
svstem and the Tele Flower Auction System (TFA). The former system 
responded to the need of large buyers, and the latter provided a new auction 
for foreign produce. While the auctions have used infornation technology 
extensively to support order processing, inventory and logistics, they 
primarily supported or automated existing auction processes having impacts 
typically limited to the auction intermediary (Van Heck and Groen, 1994). The 
IT-enabled initiatives discussed below fundamentally changed the 
implementation or conduct of one or more specific auction processes, and the 
way in which buyers, auctions, and sellers interact. Summarv information on 
the initiatives is given in the Table 4 below: 
Traditional Holland VBA Sample Holland Tele Flower 
DFA Videfleur Based Supply Bank Auction 
System Auction System 
Start 1890 1991 (1991) 1994 (1994) 1993 1993 
(End)Year 
Product Flowers and Potted Plants 
Potted Plants 
Sellers Growers Growers 
Intermediary Flower Flower 
Auctions Auction 
Holland 
(BVH) 
Buyers Wholesalers Wholesalers 
Valuation Dutch Dutch 
Auction Clock Auction Clock 
Potted Plants 
Growers 
Flower 
Auction 
Aalsmeer 
(VBA) 
Wholesalers 
Dutch 
Auction Clock 
Potted Plants Flowers 
Growers Growers 
Flower East African 
Auction Flowers 
Holland 
(BVH) 
Wholesalers Wholesalers 
Negotiated Dutch 
Posted Offer Auction Clock 
Table 4: History Dutch Flower Auctions 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
Working Paper IS-96-24 
4.1 The Vidifleur Initiative 
The BVH auction implemented the Vidifleur initiative in response to the 
orowing capacity and logistics requirements of the auction. Vidifleur intended 0 
to use video auctioning to decouple the price determination and logistics 
mechanisms, and to allow buyers to trade from outside the auction hall. 
When the product arrived at the auction, a picture was taken, digitized and 
stored in auction computers. These computers transferred the picture for 
display to a screen in the auction hall, where buyers could bid for the product 
based on the image of the product. Buyers were also able to bid for and look at 
the flowers on computer screens in their private auction offices. The 
computers in the private office provided a screen-based representation of the 
clock which was synchronized with the clock in the auction hall. 
The Vidifleur experiment initiated by the BVH information technology staff 
(Spooner and Copeland, 1992)2, was implemented with minimal changes to 
the original auction clock process. Experimenters converted one of three 
auction clocks in a room, to have video screens for product display around 
the clock. The auction also moved the real product under the auction clock, 
providing a second visual display of the product. An auction room solely 
dedicated to this experiment was unavailable given the demand for limited 
auction facilities and altering existing logistics processes was deemed too 
expensive for the experiment. 
Auctioneers expected t h s  remote video auctioning to provide buyers with 
better information, as they could work from the comfort of their own offices, 
*Spooner and Copeland (1992) provide a teaching case of IT initiatives at BVH (previously 
called Flower Auction Westland) in which they discuss the motivation and technology used to 
implement the Videfleur experiment. 
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and also access their office computers for purchasing, order, sales and local 
inventory information. The auctioneers also knew that buyers often tended 
to select goods from specific sets of growers rather than inspect the product i n  
great detail and expand the selection of producers. This buyer behaviour 
suggested that grower reputations played a substantial role in shaping 
purchases, and that the visual inspection of flowers prior to purchase was less 
important to the process. Despite these expectations, buyer reaction to screen- 
based trading was negative and led to the termination of the experiment i n  
late 1991. Table 5 below summarizes the areas of key process changes, benefit 
expectations and actual results of the initiative. We focus only on buvers, and 
the auction intermediary as no major process changes occur for sellers. 
As highlighted in Table 5 buyers cited three main reasons for not adopting the 
new system. First the clock-based trading system provided no new efficiencies 
for buyers. Second, the quality of the auction hall video display was perceived 
as poor, and trading from outside the auction hall created an informational 
disadvantage. In floor-based trading the buyers could observe each other, and 
the reactions of other major buyers (from supermarket chains, etc.,) to specific 
bids. This important non-price information was incorporated into the 
decision making of the buyers. Video-based auctioning on a computer was a 
limiting medium, not rich enough to capture this information. Thus buyers 
had limited advantage in trading from their offices, when there was also a 
floor-based auction which provided the traders with more information. 
Indeed, buyers who tried to trade from offices complained that they could not 
feel the "tension" in the market place. Third, at the back of each auction hall 
is a coffee shop were buyers interact informally and share information about 
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the market. Again, access to the social interaction and information was more 
difficult through screen-based trading. 
Table 5: Process-Stakeholder Impacts of Videfleur 
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Buyer 
no change 
no change 
no change 
no change 
In a full-scale system, buyers would 
find it harder to visually inspect 
and authenticate quality. 
Expected: Electronic communications 
could substitute for buyer presence in 
the auction halls. 
Reality: Electronic communications 
does not capture non-price 
information, such other bidders' 
expressions and reactions to specific 
bids. It reduces social interaction 
opportunities. 
Expected: Buyers would make 
decisions from their office using 
computers rather than the auction 
ha l l  
Result: Negative reaction. Buyer 
perceive the video quality as poor. 
no change 
no change 
no change 
] Negative 
Exchange Process 
1. Search 
2. Valuation 
3. Logistics 
4. Payments and 
Settlements 
5. 
Authentication 
6. 
Communication 
7. Product 
Representation 
8. Legitimation 
9. Influence 
10. Dispute 
Resolution 
Net Benefits 
Auction Intennediarv 
no change 
no change 
Expected: Auction Hall Logistics 
would be eliminated allowing for 
cheaper and more frequent 
transactions and new space for 
clocks. 
Actual: No change during the 
experiment due to potential 
disruptions to the current process. 
Real product appeared in the hall 
synchronized to clock. 
no change 
no change in the quality grading 
process 
Shift to electronic communications. 
Electronic representation of the 
clock as well as the product. 
Expected: Electronic flower clock 
and video Representation of Flowers 
would not adversely affect the sale. 
Result: Negative buyer reaction to 
video quality 
no change 
no change 
no change 
None 
4.2 The Aalsmeer Sample-Based Auction 
In contrast to the BVH, the Aalsmeer auction began a sample-based auction 
for trading potted plants (1994, Griffioen, 1994a, Van Heck and Groen, 1994). In 
this model, growers send a sample of the product to the auction house along 
with information on available inventory. During the auction the sample 
represents the entire inventory available to buyers who can bid for the 
product and specify product packaging and delivery requirements. Growers 
then package the product as specified and deliver it the next day to the buyer 
location in the auction complex or to other buyer warehouses. Growers, 
buyers and auctions used electronic data interchange to share all the 
information required in this process? This trading model reduces the number 
of times a product is handled, reducing overall packaging costs and damage. 
The different actors, the auctions, growers and buyers, expected a number of 
different benefits. First, by uncoupling logistics and price determination, the 
auctions and growers expected the number of transactions per hour to 
increase. In reality the number of transactions per hour decreased as buyers 
had to spec* terms of delivery. Second, while the auctions expected 45% of 
the supply of potted plants to be transacted irt the sample-based auction, only 
10% of the product was transacted this way. Thus, sample-based auctions also 
did not effectively reduce storage requirements at the auction. After 
numerous attempts to increase the volume of sample-based auctions they 
were discontinued in late 1994. Table 6 below summarizes results of the 
initiative. Only areas of change are discussed below: 
3~e~ inn ing  in 1992, growers and auctions adopted electronic data interchange to communicate 
product, order and transaction information to each other. ED1 reduces double entry of data into 
systems, paperwork and errors. Growers who use ED1 can submit data on shipments until 3:GU 
p.m., instead of 12:00 p.m. for paper transfer. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-96-24 
Exchange 1 Growers 
Process j 
1. Search 1 no change 
2. Valuation Expected no change i 
Result: Classify into 
smaller lot sizes so 
same product is 
sampled and 
effectively priced 
multiple'times 
Price is on average 10% 
less on remainder than 
sample lot. This 
results in less revenue. 
needing to customize 
packaging to buyer 
specifications 
Auctions / Buyers 
no change / no change 
Expected rio change. / Greater uncertainty 
Auction process is 
slowed down due to the 
need to specify packing 
information and buyer 
gaming 
Lower commissions on 
remainder of sample 
lot 
about product quality 
leads to discounting of 
non-sample lots. 
70% of previous 5 days' 
average price as a price 
floor. 
Lower logistics costs / More efficient delivery 
4. Payments no change 
Settlements 
5. Authent- 
ication 
1 1 coordination ( coordination ( coordination I 
6. Comrnun- 
ication 
no change 
Minor change: More use 
of ED1 to send 
I information 
7. Product 1 Enabled to select a 
for actual transaction 
lot 
I 
informa tion I information 
Sample lot substitutes 1 Buyers cannot visually 
Represent- 
ation 
evaluate the whole 
offer. 
Must deade to buy 
based on the sample 
lot. 
minor change ensuring 
product is properly 
delivered 
Minor change: More use 
of ED1 to send 
sample lot which is of 
higher quality than 
the remaining product 
Inability to 
authenticate quality 
ahead of time. Must 
verify product is 
properly received 
Minor change: More use 
of ED1 to send 
i 1 more complex I I I 
8. 1 no change 
Legitimation I 
9. Muence  / More difficult due to 
Resolution 1 
Net Benefits I Negative I Negative I Negative 
no change 
no change 
1 transaction / 10. Dispute no change ( no change 
Table 6: Process-Stakeholder Impacts of the Sample Based Auction 
no change 
no change 
no change 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
Working Paper IS-96-24 
The sample-based auction failed to meet expectations for many reasons. First, 
the incentives and benefits to buyers and growers (in particular) did not 
change substantially to encourage their participation in t h s  market. 
Specifically, growers received no extra compensation for modifving packaging 
and delivery practices to suit the customer. Second, the growers perceived 
that they got lower prices in a slower auction. To overcome this disadvantage 
growers would break the same product into different sample lots so that it 
would be priced multiple times during the auction hoping it would lead to 
higher prices. Third, the auction rules initially did not provide incentives to 
buyers by supporting transactions on large lots. Instead, the auction 
maintained rules to favor transactions in small lots. Thus, an insufficient 
number of buyers and sellers initially adopted this new form of trading (Van 
Heck and Ribbers, 1996). 
In response to this failure, the auction undertook various rule changes 
beginning in March 1994. First, the auction established a price floor of 70% of 
average price of a flower type in the most recent five days to reduce volatility 
and downside risks. Second, the representative lot was auctioned first. This 
sample lot typically received a higher price than following lots of the same 
type and quality. Buyers believed the first sample to always be of best quality 
within any quality rating. Third, the lot size was increased to three 
stapelwagens4 from one. The growers were also forced to increase the number 
of plants offered in any one transaction, so that they did not game the system. 
To meet the needs of large buyers, buyers were permitted to buy either one or 
three stapelwagens per transaction. To prevent gaming, the grower for any 
type of flower was only allowed one auction per category of product for price 
* Stapelwagens are a fixed size cart used to transport flowers through the auction complex. 
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determination. These rule changes temporarily stabilized the market, but the 
lack of growers and buyers adopting the method led to its demise in late 1994. 
4.3 The Holland Supply Bank: Image Representations and Negotiated Trading 
To respond to the needs of larger buyers, the BVH and Aalsmeer auctions 
have diversified to create a brolcered market for flowers. In the 
"bemiddelingsbureau"(BB) or Mediation Office, an auction employee acts as 
an agent for the growers and negotiates between growers and buyers in a 
forward market. Prices, product specifications, amount of lots, and delivery 
specifications are specified in a contract which is legitimized and monitored 
by the mediation office. About 5% of the flowers are traded this way. The 
mediation office is useful for the sale of large lots to large buyers like 
supermarkets for the occasions market. 
The mediation office, as an honest broker, reduces the costs of search, 
communications and bargaining for buyers and sellers. It also provides a 
mechanism to legitimate the transaction and resolve disputes in the event 
the contract is not met. Image databases of product types and inventory are 
especially useful for transactions in the mediation office. Wholesale buyers 
find that the pictures of the product are also very useful marketing tools to 
downstream retailers. Electronic data interchange is used for communications 
of orders and the coordination of settlements, and delivery. This results 
results in fewer errors and greater transaction efficiency. 
Table 7 below summarizes the major impacts of the Holland Supply Bank o n  
different stakeholders. 
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[ Exchange Growers / Auctions I Buyers 
Process I 
1. Search 1 Benefit: The HSB I Benefit: Efficient Benefit Large buyers' 1 
I permits growers to 
I search for buyers. 
2. Valuation 1 Expected no change 
I Benefit: 
1 Slightly higher prices 
I with less uncertainty 
3. Logistics i Benefit: Efficient 
j product transferin bulk 
/ to buyer 
4. Payments / As specified in the 
and I contract 
ication I 
I 
I 
image database 
combined with broker 
Settlements 
5. Authent- / no change 
search costs are reduced 
matching svstem. 
Mediation process is 
less costly than 
logistics-intensive 
process 
Benefits: Less logistics 
in the auction hall 
Managed by mediation 
office 
Costs: quality 1 Cost: Lnability to I 
Cost: Slightly higher 
prices but reduced 
uncertain9 
Benefits: Direct 
delivery from seller 
with no repacking costs 
As specified in the 
contract 
managers evaluate 
sample, and assign a 
quality grade. 
Monitor and ensure 
authenticate quality 
ahead of time 
6. Cornrnun- Minor change: More use 
ication of ED1 to send 
Table 7: Process-Stakeholder Impacts of the Holland Supply Bank 
4.4 The Tele Flower Auction System 
delivery 
Minor change: More use 
of ED1 to send / coordination 
/ information 
Since 1993, the Dutch flower industry has been concerned about the 
increasing flow of foreign flower products into the Dutch flower auctions and 
Minor change: More use 
of ED1 to send 
coordination 
informa tion 
Cost: Quality 
managers create a 
digital image of 
sample lot to present to 
buyers in addition to 
the rating. 
Mediation office 
no change 
mediation office 
Positive - less logistics 
requirements 
7. Product 
Represent- 
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coordination 
information 
Cost: Buyers cannot 
visually evaluate the 
offer and perceive 
quality grades are 
broad. 
Benefit. However, 
images are useful for 
downstream trade 
no change 
no change 
no change 
Positive - ability to 
transact for large lots 
into the future 
Cost: Growers send 
data and sample lot. 
ation Growers perceive 1 quality grades as broad 
/ and don't reflect true 
I 
I 
1 
8. 1 no change 
Legitimation I 
9. Influence 1 no change 
10. Dispute j no change 
Resolution / 
Net Benefit / Positive - higher prices 
1 and less uncertainty 
i 
downstream logistics and distribution svstems. These imports were having 
an adverse effect on the margins of Dutch growers and the prices of kev 
commodity products like roses and carnations. After a referendum in  
September 1994, the growers, who are the owners of the Dutch auctions, 
decided to ban foreign grower participation in the auctions during the 
summer. These efforts to reduce foreign access to the traditional Dutch 
auctions, led buyer organizations and foreign growers to announce the 
creation of competing auctions. In particular, the East African Flower (EAF) 
importers association, responded to this ban by developing the Tele Flower 
Auction (TFA) (Van Heck, et al., 1997). 
TFA is a completely electronic auction that enables buyers to trade at a 
distance. Decoupling the logistics and price discovery processes the buyers can 
bid for different flowers via their personal computer (PC) screens (Bos, 1995, 
Bos, 1996, Eras, 1995, Van Vliet, 199413). Using ISDN services of the Dutch PTT, 
each buyer's PC is connected from their office to a fully-computerized Dutch 
auction clock. The PC provides information on the producer, product, unit of 
currency, quality and minimum purchase quantity. For added convenience, 
the PC also provides the buyer with textual information on the available 
flowers and specific lots for sale. The buyer can then use the PC's custom 
software to flag interesting lots, so that the computer can alert the buyer when 
it is time to auction the specific lot. On the PC screen the buyer sees the 
Dutch auction clock. The clock hand starts at a high price and drops until a 
buyer stops the clock by pushing the space bar at the keyboard of the PC. The 
auctioneer then asks the buyer via an open telephone connection how many 
flowers of the lot he or she will buy. When the buyer provides the amount, 
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the auctioneer legitimates the transaction. The clock is then reset and the 
process begins for the next lot, until the remainder of the product is sold. 
The auction logistics are substantially simpler than the traditional DFA. The 
EAF receives and stores flowers and plants from growers in a distribution 
warehouse facility in the nearby town of Amstelveen. The flowers from the 
Amstelveen facility are transported to the wholesaler's address directlv by 
transporters of EAF. In an agreement with the VBA, the EAF was also 
permitted to deliver products to the buyer's rented facilities at the VBA. This 
way the auction minimizes most internal logistics operations and is able to 
deliver flowers to buyers in a timely way. The major process changes relative 
to the traditional Dutch auction are summarized in the table 8 below. 
Overall, TFA was an immediate success. Since its implementation in March 
1995, it has grown from auctioning the product of the 15 main East African 
growers to include products from Spain, Colombia, France, India, and Israel. 
By the end of the year, the TFA had nearly 160 buyers (about half are located 
in the Aalsmeer area; the rest are scattered throughout the Netherlands). The 
TFA was estimated to be the fourth largest flower auction in Holland by the 
end of 1996. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVorking Paper IS-96-24 
Exchange 1 Growers 1 Auctions ( Buyers 
Process I 
1. Search no change from DFA / Benefit: Efficient / Benefit: Up-to-date 
- / databases and online I online database reduces 1 
I 1 1 buyers of opportunities. 
2. Valuation 1 no change I Very efficient screen- / Benefit: Screen trading / 
system for presenting 
trade opportunities 
search costs for specific 
products. Alerts inform 
I 
i 
1 
I 
i 
3. Logistics Benefit: Efficient I product transfer to 
/ Amstelveen 
1 warehouses 1 
I 
24-hour payment and 
and 4. I settlement clearing. 
Settlements / 
1 
6. Cornmun- / Simplified phone and 
ication 1 data communications 
8. I Benefit: Growers don't Legitimation have to be an EAF 
i member, enabling foreign imports 
9. Influence / Growers have little / influence on auction 
1 policies 
10. Dispute / no change 
Resolution 
based auction clock 
process 
Benefits: No auction 
hall logistics are 
necessary. Less errors 
due to simplicity of a 
decoupled system. 
Cost Transport to buyer 
locations 
Managed by EAF 
Costs: quality 
managers evaluate 
sample, and assign a 
strict quality grade. 
Monitor and ensure 
delivery 
5. Authent- 
ication 
I 
2. Product / Cost: Growers perceive 
Net Benefit Positive: for excluded 
enables better 
oversight and 
concentration on 
bid ding 
Benefits: Faster 
delivery from auction 
due to decoupling of 
logistics and price 
discovery. 
24-hour payment and 
settlement clearing. 
Benefit Auction 
quality control reduces 
risks - may exceed 
buyer expectations. 
Cost: Inability to 
authenticate quality 
no change 
Simplified phone and 
data communications. 
Represent- 
ation 
/ foreign growers 
1 
ahead of time 
Text representations 
enable simplified 
quality grades as broad 
and don't reflect true 
quality. 
I 
Cost: Text 
EAF organization Buyers do not have 
defines the market direct influence on 
by the auction reduces 
cornrnunica tions. 
Cost: Buyers cannot 
representation of 
product in addition to 
the quality rating. 
EAF is primary 
authority 
visuall; evaluate the 
offer. 
Benefits: Screen-based 
representations enable 
remote trading 
no change 
Table 8: Process-Stakehold er Impacts of the Tele Flower 
costs 
Positive: lower cost 
auction model 
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Positive: product access 
and remote buying 
Why were buyers willing to accept this new auction? First, it uniquely 
satisfied the buyers' needs to inexpensively purchase foreign flowers and 
include them in their existing distribution chains. Second, buyers we 
interviewed said the flowers they purchased from the TFA often exceeded 
their quality expectations as determined by the quality grades. Thus, the TFA 
created a reputation for setting high quality standards, enhancing trust in the 
auction and minimizing adverse selection. If necessary buyers close to the 
warehouse location could physically inspect the product. Buyers miere also 
impressed with the computer data, the quality of the products, and the speed 
of delivery after their purchases were completed. The buyers also felt they 
had a better overview of the auction, as compared with the traditional Dutch 
auction. 
5.0 Lessons Learned from IT-Innovations in the Dutch Flower Auctions. 
Based on our research we did a cross-case analysis to identify factors that 
influence the successful or unsuccessful use of information technology in 
markets. We use this analysis to develop a series of observations on the 
market impacts of IT as well as the success and failure of IT-based initiatives 
in markets. These observations stated as propositions, and the supporting 
analysis and discussion are given below. 
P I :  The application of information technologies to trading can enable 
increased efficiency and separation of informational and physical trading 
processes. This in turn will permit more varied forms of trading customized 
to different user requirements. 
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The four cases illustrate the use of information technology to separate the 
informational and physical trading processes. In all cases the valuation and 
logistic processes are increasingly de-coupled from one another in time and 
space. For example, the Holland Supply Bank illustrates the implementation 
of the mediation bureau to broker trading of large futures contracts between 
large buvers and different growers separating logistics and information 
processes. Sirnilarily, in the Tele Flower auction, the buyers are able to bid for 
products from remote locations. The buyers can customize the system by 
specifying preferences and receiving alerts when the product they want is 
being auctioned. 
These observations also lend support to Malone and Yates, et al. (1987), who 
note that information technology enables personalized markets where 
software agents would support trading customized to individuals and firm 
preferences. While the new flower auctions are not as fully advanced, they 
achieve a better fit between the transaction preferences of larger buyers, and 
the organization of exchange processes by overcoming the capacity limits and 
colocation requirements for floor-based trading. These new trading 
mechanisms better suit the unique requirements of large vs. small buyers. 
The observations across cases illustrate that information technology 
substantially reduces coordination costs and enhance communications 
capabilities. These changes allow transacting parties to separate in space (e.g 
TFA bidding process) and time (e.g HSB delivery logistics) the informational 
and physical components of trading processes. Indeed, the informational and 
physical components within each of the ten exchange processes defined in 
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t h s  paper could be decoupled from one another and provided bv different 
actors without the necessity for colocation. Over time t h s  will permit the 
creation of more distributed and customized market institutions for the trade 
of physical goods. 
P2: Information technology-enabled process innovations change the 
i~zformation available to different stakeholders. When different stakeholders 
perceive these changes reduce the relevant information or trust,  they will act 
to either increase the information available or discount prices to account for 
increased risks. 
Market organizations, like other governance systems, are information 
processing systems that represent a consensus among different competing 
stakeholders on organizing the interdependent processes identified in section 
2. These processes serve to generate, organize information, or reduce 
uncertainties and mitigate opportunism risks faced by different stakeholders 
(Kambil, 1992). The prior literature on markets and technology generally 
presumes that information technology applications enable the provision of 
more relevant information to decision makers (Bakos, 1991b, Brynjolfsson, et 
al., 1994, Gurbaxani and Whang, 1991, Malone, et al., 1987). However, the 
cases above illustrate that IT can actually reduce the relevant information 
available to decision makers. The application of information technology to 
communication and product representation processes had major impacts on 
relevant information available for price discovery, authentication, and 
logistics processes. When information or trust as perceived by specific 
stakeholders was reduced in these processes, they or other interested 
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stakeholders acted to increase the information and trust, or reduced prices to 
discount for new risks. 
For example, in the SBA the buyers chose to discount the prices bid for non- 
sample lots by nearly ten percent because they could no longer authenticate 
quality by visual inspection. Similarily, growers in the SBA decreased lot sizes 
or reclassified their product so that the same product was displayed multiple 
times. The growers' objective was to have multiple new bidding cycles for 
price determination, hoping that multiple bidding competitions for smaller 
lots among buyers would generate new demand information leading to 
higher prices. Both of these responses reduced the attractiveness and 
efficiency of the sample- based auction, leading to its ultimate demise. 
While the Holland Supply Bank and the Tele Flower auction reduced the 
ability of real-time authentication of the product, they provided new benefits 
to the different stakeholders or created trust in new ways. In the former, 
parties were able to trade in a way which reduced uncertainty and generated 
information about future availability of demand, prices and goods. In the 
latter, to create trust among buyers in the new auction process and establish a 
reputation for quality, the Tele Flower auction ensured that the product 
matched or exceeded buyers' expectations given a specific quality rating. 
While we cannot establish that the product was traded at a lower price than 
when it was visually inspected, the tight quality control that assures a product 
matches or exceeds its quality ratings, leaves it open to being discounted to the 
price level of the quality rating rather than the price of the flower given 
perfect quality information. 
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The above observations are consistent with prior research on the governance 
of exchange relations. First, the need for information seeking to reduce 
uncertainty is well known. The generation of trust (the expectation of future 
non-opportunistic behavior) and preservation of good reputations is also 
important to reduce transaction costs or "friction" in exchange (Arrow, 1974, 
Fukuyama, 1995). Third, social exchange theorists have identified the 
importance of equity and fairness (Blau, 1964, Homans, 1961). What the cases 
illustrate is that reductions in information available due to an IT-enabled 
process discontinuity creates new information seeking or trust-generation 
costs. Market designers can respond to these requirements by allowing more 
information gathering by different stakeholders (buyers and sellers) or create 
trust and reputations for fairness. Both of these choices lead to differential 
levels and allocations of costs across stakeholders. These costs and their 
distribution across stakeholders must be considered by designers of new IT- 
enabled market mechanisms if the new market is to be adopted. 
P3: Market organizations are the meeting point for multiple stakeholders: 
buyers, sellers, and intermediaries with confficting incentives. Given existing 
or competing market alternatives, no new IT-based initiative is likely to 
succeed if any key stakeholder is worse off after the IT enabled innovation, 
The process-stakeholder analysis framework developed in section 2 of this 
paper was applied to map process changes and their impacts on different 
stakeholders. In the two cases of failure, the application of the framework 
clearly identified either the grower or the buyer was worse off from the 
innovation. For example, in the SBA, the grower incurred new packaging 
costs and logistics costs. In the Vidifleur auction, the buyers did not perceive a 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IVork'ing Paper IS-96-24 
new benefit from the system. The video qualitv was poor, authentication of 
qualitv less convenient, and trading online did not provide all the 
information available in the auction hall. 
In contrast, the Holland Supply Bank and the Tele Flower auctions created 
new advantages for all stakeholders who participated. In the Holland Supply 
Bank, buyers were able to order large quantities of product and specify a 
contract for delivery on a future date, reducing the growers' uncertainty about 
future price levels. The Tele Flower auctions provided Dutch buyers with a 
source of foreign flowers, and foreign growers with a trading location which 
could take advantage of the Dutch wholesaler's demand for flowers, and 
downstream logistics facilities. 
These cases illustrate the need to carefully design and implement electronic 
markets and to include adequate incentives to different stakeholders for 
participation. All stakeholders must be better off with the new system rather 
than the old system. Otherwise the new market will fail and revert back to the 
prior system if this alternative remains available. The process-stakeholder 
analysis framework can be used by market designers to evaluate the 
consequences of their designs on processes and stakeholders to fulfill the 
above conditions. 
P4: Biases in  trading will depend on the ownership of the market and the 
availability of cost-effective trading alternatives. As owners of existing 
markets may not benefit from electronic trading, this incentive 
incompatibility will impede the transition to new electronic markets. A 
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solution t o  this problem is to change market ownership or create new sources 
of compet i t ion.  
Why did the traditional Dutch markets fail to successfully adopt an electronic 
trading system? Why did the leading auctions allow the Tele Flower auction 
to reframe competition among the auctions? In part, the various electronic 
initiatives of the traditional auctions did not fulfill compelling needs among 
the different stakeholders. In addition, the IT-based trading initiatives were 
embedded in a specific organizational context and set of assumptions which 
limited the initiatives. 
Historically, the Dutch grower cooperatives have owned the auctions and 
have been the dominant influence on the use of technology in the auctions. 
The well-organized growers who own the auction intermediary established a 
consensus on the trading rules and organization that best favored specific 
grower groups --from clock speeds to auction mechanism. 
The technology-enabled initiatives of the existing auctions, with the 
exception of the Holland Supply Bank, generally assumed the existing 
valuation model and auction structure. As auction officials mentioned to us 
in interviews prior to the Tele Flower initiative, it was unlikely that any 
other form of trading or price discovery mechanism would be approved by 
the owners other than the Dutch auction. The i ~ o v a t i o n s  were thus 
embedded within the context and framework of the traditional auction 
model. Converting this model to an IT-based representation had the potential 
for a number of advantages to sellers. For example, by having a very fast 
auction clock, and trading in small lots in the traditional auction, the sellers 
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found they could get hgher prices. Electronic trading which preserved these 
features benefits the sellers but creates more costs for larger buyers who are 
increasingly important in the market. Other price discovery mechanisms and 
trading rules, including larger lots, can be more efficient for large buyers. 
As buyers become more powerful, and move to bypass the auctions or source 
foreign flowers, the existing consensus auction arrangement is being re- 
negotiated. For example, by not participating in the sample auction, the 
buyers were able to influence the restructuring of the sample-based auctions. 
Second, the Holland Supply Bank brokered market represents another new 
arrangement for large buyers. Finally, the Tele Flower auction was the EAF 
and the buyers' response to restrictive foreign flower trading rules in the 
traditional Dutch flower auctions. The latter was a departure from re- 
negotiating the consensus around a specific auction to creating a competing 
structure. This structure was created because the traditional auctions were 
forced to restrict the sale of foreign flowers by their owners. 
The emergence of Tele Flower is especially instructive. Despite the advice of 
the traditional Dutch Auction officials, the owners voted to deny access to 
foreign growers. The subsequent creation of the Tele Flower auction resulted 
in the loss of a key revenue stream to the existing auctions and its owners. 
Conforming to the existing auction models limited innovation by the 
traditional Dutch auctions. In contrast, information technology allowed the 
EAF to coordinate and implement trading processes without colocation and at 
lower costs than setting up a facility similar to the traditional Dutch auctions. 
As buyers and foreign growers implement and continue to innovate in 
developing alternate markets, they will, most likely, increasingly reshape the 
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access, price determination and trading rules to their favor. The emergence of 
Tele Flower could probably have been avoided if the buyers had an 
ownership stake and greater influence in the traditional Dutch auctions. This 
would have led to less biased or restrictive trading practices. We expect that 
information technology will enable new trading patterns that are less biased 
in favor of Dutch growers. These new trading models (e-g., clearinghouse 
auctions, brokered markets) could better serve different buyer segments. 
In summary, current owners of the auctions may not have sufficient 
incentives to adopt new or more efficient auction mechanisms. The capacity 
of existing market structures to adapt to new electronic and non-electronic 
innovations will be determined by the relative power and capabilities of 
different parties to the trade, the current ownershp structures and potential 
of competitive entry. In the Dutch auctions, we see an increasing shift of 
power toward buyers as new sources of supply become available, buyers 
become larger, and technology enables new low-cost trading mechanisms 
leading to competing markets. 
6.0 Conclusions 
This paper makes four key contributions to the literature on information 
technology and markets. First, we identify a series of distinct processes that 
underlie exchange relations. In contrast to the traditional case studies of 
electronic markets, t h s  categorization provides a useful basis for examining 
how technology innovations affect specific trading processes. Second, we 
propose and illustrate the use of the process-stakeholder analysis framework 
for comparing different forms of trading, and evaluate the impacts o n  
different market participants. This is a useful guide for designers of new 
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market systems as well as those studying markets to evaluate or explain the 
successes and failures of IT-based initiatives in new markets. Third, the 
development of a detailed case study of market change and a cross- case 
analysis of IT initiatives in the Dutch flower markets result in a series of 
testable propositions. The propositions address the separation of physical and 
informational processes in trading, the responses of stakeholders to changes 
in information in markets due to IT initiatives, and economic and incentive 
conditions required for adoption of new trading processes. Finally, we 
propose a more complex and subtle view of markets than typically analyzed 
in the MIS literature. 
While there are a number of teaching and research cases on electronic 
markets, these are either unsuitable for generating new theories (Kambil and 
Short, 1994) or typically narrowly apply transactions cost or network 
externality models to emergent markets (Bakos, 1991b, Lee, 1996). While some 
of the analysis provides conditions for market adoption, they shed little light 
on why different actors failed to adopt new market forms. In contrast, the rich 
cases in this study illustrate that markets represent a socially constructed 
consensus that is constantly renegotiated among stakeholders with different 
levels of power. Information technology, by enabling new low-cost trading 
mechanisms arid changing information available to stakeholders, is one 
factor which can alter the relative costs and benefits to actors, or the power of 
actors leading to a renegotiation of the consensus. When the renegotiation 
fails, the new market form is not adopted. As new information technologies 
make feasible new models of electronic commerce, our analysis suggests that 
designers of new markets should carefully manage the context in which they 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stem School of Business 
IX~ork'ing Paper IS-96-24 
apply their technologies, by constructing suitable incentives and processes to 
arrive at a consensus. 
Finally, the paper provides new tools and directions for inquiry for managers 
and researchers of electronic commerce. First the process-stakeholder 
framework allows managers and researchers to systematically characterize 
process changes and the allocation of costs and benefits from electronic 
commerce. Second, the cases highlights new questions research. The design of 
As the Internet evolves to a powerful and reliable infrastructure for electronic 
commerce, Dutch auctions become more important as a trading mechanism. 
However there is little published empirical research on the Dutch auction 
mechanism and the effects of clock speed, and other information variables o n  
equilibrium prices, buyer strategies, and and the distribution of benefits. New 
development tools (Java etc) will enable researchers to develop simulations 
and test market designs over the Internet to develop a richer understanding 
of individual behaviors in electronic markets. 
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